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Towards a Bayesian evaluation of features in questioned handwritten
signatures
Abstract
In this work we propose the construction of a evaluative framework for supporting experts in questioned
signature examinations. Through the use of Bayesian networks, we envision to quantify the probative value
of well defined measurements performed on questioned signatures, in a way that is both formalised and part
of a coherent approach to evaluation.
At the current stage, our project is explorative, focusing on the broad range of aspects that relate to com-
parative signature examinations. The goal is to identify writing features which are both highly discriminant,
and easy for forensic examiners to detect. We also seek for a balance between case-specific features and
characteristics which can be measured in the vast majority of signatures. Care is also taken at preserving
the interpretability at every step of the reasoning process.
This paves the way for future work, which will aim at merging the diﬀerent contributions to a single
probabilistic measure of strength of evidence using Bayesian networks.
Keywords: Bayesian networks, signature evidence, Fourier descriptors, multivariate likelihood ratio
1. Introduction
Handwritten signatures have been employed
since centuries as a means of authenticating one’s
identity on oﬃcial documents. Their study has
been one of the oldest disciplines in forensic science,
yet its evaluative part did not achieve the same level
of refinement as others.
Several professional groups, such as questioned
document examiners, are trained to testify in courts
by following established examination protocols for
handwritten signatures. However, the usage of
handwritten evidence in courts raises a number of
issues. The scientific foundations of forensic hand-
writing comparisons are regularly doubted, in par-
ticular the mechanism by which forensic examiners
arrive at and state their conclusions is often ques-
tioned. Specifically, the evaluation process is highly
expert dependent and does not rely on standardized
measurements and lines of reasoning, being thus
highly dependent on the skill and proficiency of each
examiner.
The use of forensic science in legal proceedings
is based on the so-called “evaluative” framework:
instead of stating a probability for a hypothesis,
forensic experts report an expression of strength
of support against two competing hypotheses, of
forensic and legal interest[1]. To help evaluate the
strength of support, a likelihood ratio is used in or-
Preprint submitted to Science & Justice January 26, 2017
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der to formalise the reasoning of the expert with
respect to the relevant scientific findings.
The advantages of this evaluative framework are
multiple: while formalised reasoning is much less
liable to logical fallacies, experts will not express
their beliefs on matters for which a court is respon-
sible, notably on the hypotheses of interest. Fur-
ther, the approach clarifies that the probability of
hypotheses of interest also depends on information
other than the scientific findings, allowing thus legal
decision makers to incorporate in their reasoning a
broad range of collateral case information.
1.1. The defence hypothesis
In forensic science, case-based evidence is col-
lected and assessed under at least two competing
hypotheses, those of the prosecution and the de-
fence. In the domain of comparative forensic doc-
ument examination, evidence takes the form of ob-
served similarities and diﬀerences between ques-
tioned and reference (“known”) items. To assess its
value with respect to the competing hypotheses, the
forensic scientist needs to evaluate the rarity of such
similarities and diﬀerences in a given population of
potential writers.
The choice and the size of the relevant popula-
tion is of utmost importance, as it is very easy to
overestimate the relevance of a character trait if it
is shared by many or all the users of a determinate
writing system [2]. For example, one may compare
the writing features of a questioned item against
those of two individuals, a number of suspects, or
any other set of potential writers. If the relevant
population spans a restricted number of individu-
als, the comparison is said to be a “closed-set”: on
the other hand, if the population at large is consid-
ered, the situation is labelled “open-set” [3].
As a result, the value of the scientific findings
strongly depends on their rarity in the reference
population, though some traits might be more dis-
criminating between two individuals rather than
among a broader group of writers.
In this article we mostly focus on closed-set cir-
cumstances, leaving the possibility to extend to
open-set situations in future works.
1.2. Elements of Bayesian networks
To depict the reasoning using the previously il-
lustrated intepretative framework, consider a single
variable H which can assume two mutually exclu-
sive states Hp and Hd, respectively the prosecution
and the defence hypothesis. In a questioned signa-
ture examination scenario, we may associate e.g.,
Hp = “Person A has written the questioned signa-
ture” andHd =“An unknown person has written the
questioned signature”. Let E be the set of findings,
as detected by the expert (e.g., similarities and dif-
ferences between the questioned signature and the
reference specimens). We denote with I the back-
ground information on the case, available to the
expert.
Relevant to the recipient of expert information
are the prior beliefs on Hp and Hd, conditioned by
the background information: these are the proba-
bilities Pr (H = hp | I) and Pr (H = hd | I), respec-
tively1. More precisely, their ratio (called prior
odds) is the relative strength of belief in H a priori.
1The reason for which hp and hd are written in lower-case
letters is explained in Section 3.
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The role of the expert is to evaluate the
probability of having observed E under hp and
hd: these terms are Pr (E | H = hp, I) and
Pr (E | H = hp, I), respectively.
Bayes’ theorem then states that the relative
strength of belief in H a posteriori is proportional
to the prior odds. In formulae:
Pr (H = hp | E, I)
Pr (H = hp | E, I)
= LR
Pr (H = hp | I)
Pr (H = hd | I)
where
LR =
Pr (E | H = hp, I)
Pr (E | H = hp, I)
is called likelihood ratio. We observe that LR pro-
vides the expression for the strength of support of
E versus the considered H: if LR > 1, E provides
more support to hp rather than hd, conditioned on
the background information, and vice versa. No-
tice that it does not imply that hp is more probable
than hd. To dissect the definition of the LR, the nu-
merator reads as the probability of having observed
E under hp: referring to the previous example, it
amounts to asking “what is the probability of ob-
serving the set of concordances and discordances
in genuine signatures of Person A?”. The denom-
inator, instead, is the probability of observing the
same set of findings in signatures that appear to
belong to Person A, but instead have been forged
by someone else: this is assessed using the relevant
population, defined in Section 1.1. In other terms,
the LR is the ratio of two probabilities that account
for, respectively, the intra- and inter - variability of
findings.
Note that to apply the evaluative framework, one
needs to specify not only the numerical values for
I
H E
Figure 1: The example in Section 1.2 as a Bayesian
network. Note that the node I is usually omitted.
the beliefs, but also the dependences between the
variables in terms of conditional probabilities. This
can be intuitively represented in a graphical nota-
tion, which enables the forensic scientist to con-
sider cases with multiple variables with diﬀering
interdependence. The obtained graphs are named
Bayesian networks [4]: for instance, the previous
example can be represented in Figure 1. Note that
the background information I is used to condition
all relevant probabilities associated to H and E.
For the sake of simplicity, such dependence is gen-
erally just assumed without a clear representation
in the network. As a consequence, information I is
usually omitted from explicit graphical representa-
tion in Bayesian networks.
Bayesian networks are very flexible, and have
been used to support evaluative reasoning in very
diﬀerent forensic branches such as firearms [5],
printed documents [6], signatures [7], forensic
medicine [8] and DNA [9]. A review on the usage of
Bayesian networks in forensic science can be found
in [10].
1.3. Hierarchical evidence evaluation
A Bayesian network can be built for a rather
generic evaluative procedure (e.g., the two-trace
problem in [11]), but its structure can also be mod-
ified in order to accommodate for missing evidence
3
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[10]. Specifically, a binary-valued node M can be
added to the network, encoding the fact that some
evidence E is expected, but has not been retrieved
(i.e., is missing). The usual assessments on the
probability of E are now conditional on M .
The flexibility of Bayesian networks allows us to
assess the probative value in complex cases, using
evidence which is more and more case-based. In
the works described later on, we envision to build
a useful model to capture the essential features of
the process of signature comparison, to help evalu-
ating evidence which can always be measured (e.g.,
physical dimensions of the signatures) up to specific
traits of one’s signature (e.g., inner angles), which
might not always be recognisable.
2. Related work
2.1. Pattern Recognition literature
A large amount of work has been recently done in
building automatic classifiers for signatures. Most
often, they exploit features which are not easy to
describe (either empirically or mathematically), or
have limited forensic interest. Such systems can
be designed to work in a multi-writer environ-
ment, with known or unknown sources. A num-
ber of literature review papers are available, such
as [12, 13, 14].
Several international competitions of automated
forensic handwriting analysis (AFHA) have also
been organised, mostly related to ICDAR con-
ferences: typically, they required participants to
test their working systems on a common signature
database, built specifically for the contest.
The literature distinguishes between studying on-
line signatures (i.e., whose speed, acceleration and
stroke-order data is recorded in real-time) and oﬀ-
line signatures (i.e., where only the finished written
signature is studied) [14], but also classifies the sig-
natures according to their “grade” of forgery. Since
an automatic approach is sought, researchers fre-
quently aim at distinguishing one’s signature from
another’s, with no attempt at forgery (i.e., ran-
dom forgery) [12]. If the forger is aware of the
victim’s name but signed in his own style, we talk
about blind forgery ; if the forger has obtained some
genuine specimens and has actively tried to repro-
duce the victim’s signature, one talks about skilled
forgery.
However, our goal is not to build an entirely
automatic system to classify signatures (which is
the goal of AFHA discipline), but to find a means
to support the forensic document examiner in his
evaluation. A fully automatic approach would be
useless to him, since, for example, by his exper-
tise he would also consider a number of characteris-
tics which are related to the context of the con-
tested specimens (e.g., type of instrument, writ-
ing position, nature of document, secondary traces
such as blood or fingermarks, and reasons behind a
forgery): an automatic approach cannot deal with
these characteristics, since they are necessarily tied
to a specific forensic case. Moreover, works in Pat-
tern Recognition literature achieve very high clas-
sification rates (see Table V in [14]), but do so in a
not forensically interesting environment, both due
to the usage of diﬀerent hypotheses (e.g., writing
position, type of instrument and psychological con-
ditions) and to the way in which conclusions are
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reported. They also typically make no reference to
the chosen population under the defence hypothesis
(see Section 1.1).
To reconnect with the Pattern Recognition
nomenclature, the aim of this work is to study
skilled forgeries in an oﬀ-line setting. However, the
choice of features which will be examined and their
integration into the evaluative framework is very
diﬀerent.
2.2. Forensic handwriting examination literature
As stated before, forensic handwriting examina-
tion is one of the oldest disciplines of forensic sci-
ence. A great deal of literature is available on the
subject, suggesting a number of traits of signatures
and handwriting to be considered for evaluation:
for example see [2, 15, 16, 17] and [18]. How-
ever, few of these works actually report quantita-
tive means for obtaining measurements, and those
who do have been often targets of criticism (see
[19] and [20]). Scarce progress was made in the
quest for the formalisation of handwriting exam-
inations until very recent years, with the advent
of increasing computational power, refined mathe-
matical techniques and sophisticated forensic tools.
Among other works, we highlight [21], [22] and [23].
Here, we chose to follow the initial part of [21] on
signatures on paintings, for multiple reasons. Her
work strives to achieve the same goals as ours, albeit
in diﬀerent contexts. The analysis of painted sig-
natures deeply draws from the classical expertise in
forensic document examination, on which our work
will be based: as a consequence, the adopted fea-
tures are related only to distances and angles inside
each signature. The scope of [21] is mainly quanti-
tative, and is aimed at building an evaluative pro-
cedure under the Bayesian framework.
In [23], the authors illustrated a method to dis-
criminate writers based on the shape of the cap-
ital letter “O”, further extended to other charac-
ters in later works [24, 25, 26]. Specifically, loops
of closed characters are described in terms of har-
monic content of the shape contour, being thus
easily classifiable by a set of numbers separating,
e.g., “small, shaky and elongated loops” from “round
and smooth circles”. This method is striking in its
match between simplicity and visual eﬀectiveness,
therefore we decided to adopt it as a part of our
framework.
3. Notation
In this section we define the notation that will be
used in this work.
Where possible, upper-case letters will denote
random variables (e.g., H), whose realisations are
indicated with lower-case letters (e.g., H = h). Vec-
tors will be underlined (e.g., X). We may also ob-
tain a number of observations from a single ran-
dom variable: the i-th realisation will be indicated
with a parenthesized superscript. For example,
s = (s(i))ni=1 is a collection of n realisations of the
random variable S.
In forensic literature it is customary to specify
the competing hypotheses by means of the variable
H taking values in {Hp, Hd}, respectively for the
prosecution and the defence. In light of previous
remarks, Hp and Hd will then be indicated in lower-
case notation (i.e., hp and hd).
In this work several signatures of a single per-
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son, denoted A, were analysed. In addition, a
number of forged specimens were provided by sev-
eral forgers. The latter are anonymously denoted
by F1, F2, F3, F4. The set of all forgers is de-
noted with FAll. We indicate the writer of the i-
th specimen with the variable w(i), taking values in
WAll = {A} ∪ FAll. Notice that w is supposed to be
known, but it will be used only for ease of notation
rather than inference.
Further definitions about the acquired corpora
are given in Table 1 and Table 2.
4. Methodology
4.1. Signature acquisition: the corpora
143 signatures of a single person A were collected
over the period of a month, writing in small batches
to avoid hand fatigue and adaptation. All signa-
tures have been written with a black ball-point pen
on unruled white paper in a normal sitting posi-
tion. As [27] reports, the absolute size of writing
is deeply aﬀected by available space, hence enough
space has been left on the sides to prevent any re-
straining eﬀect.
Forged samples were provided by 4 other per-
sons, with no past experience in signature forgery
and document examination. Each forger received
the authentic corpus, and was instructed to practice
forgeries to one’s liking. Each forger reproduced at
least 20 forgeries each over a week period, with a
black pen in a normal sitting position. Tracing has
been forbidden.
All collected signatures have been digitalized at
600 dpi and saved in an uncompressed grayscale for-
mat. The composition of the corpora is summarised
Writer N° Description
A nA = 143 Authentic corpus
F1 nF1 = 35
F2 nF2 = 20
F3 nF3 = 21
F4 nF4 = 20
FAll = {F1, F2, F3, F4} nF = 96 Forged corpora
WAll = {A,F1, F2, F3, F4} n = 239 Full corpus
Table 1: Composition and notation of the corpora.
in Table 1.
4.2. Signature processing
As some features require the extraction of the
contour and pixel values, each image needs to be
further processed. Specifically, each signature is iso-
lated from the background by means of a combina-
tion of morphological operators [28]. Consequently,
each pixel of the image is either part of the back-
ground or of the signature.
As no guideline is provided onto the writing pa-
per, signatures are rotated in order to compensate
for the baseline inclination, evaluated by inspection.
However, there were no cases in the corpora with
extreme slant. This step is not necessary if only
distance-based features (e.g., length of a particular
ascender, or width of a word) are retained.
The implementation of [23] necessitates to locate
closed loops in signatures. For each signature in
the corpora, at most 5 loops were identified, each
one attributable to the shape of single characters
(“a”, “b”, “o”). Loops were closed by hand if a clo-
sure did not significantly alter their shape (i.e., very
small opening, or the closing is strongly suggested
by the surrounding character traits), while missing
6
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loops (i.e., either open or not present at all) were
labelled as such. After normalizing the area of each
loop, the contour was separated using morpholog-
ical operators, and a vector of Fourier descriptors
was extracted. 4 harmonics were retained, thereby
producing 8 pairs of values (amplitude and phase)
for each loop. Harmonics greater than the fifth or-
der were discarded, as their shape contribution was
visually negligible.
4.3. Keypoints and measures
Following [21], 19 keypoints were hand picked in
order to identify features which are both relevant to
forensic examination, and easy to locate in the au-
thentic signatures. The keypoints were afterwards
matched in all corpora by human inspection. It
is worthwhile noting that a given keypoint can fail
to be present on a specimen: this information has
been retained rather than discarded, and provides a
further novelty in future works with respect to [21].
The list of chosen keypoints is graphically repre-
sented in Figure 2, along with two samples from the
corpora.
The set of keypoints serves as a basis to obtain
measurements such as distances, angles, and ra-
tios of distances. Such a list of measures is re-
ported in Table 2. To reduce the huge amount
of measurements which can be extracted, we de-
cided to initially focus only on those which can
be reliably transposed to other kinds of signatures.
Nevertheless, as mentioned in Section 1.3, fea-
tures which are highly signature-dependent (such
as Θ1,Θ2,Θ3,Φ1,Φ2) can be integrated in the
Bayesian network to provide further support to (or
against) the hypotheses.
5. Results
5.1. Absolute dimensions
The simplest analysis which can be done is to
study the absolute dimensions of signature sam-
ples, S1 and S2. Collected data is represented in
Figure 3. It is evident that layman forgers were
disregarding the absolute dimensions of the spec-
imens, thereby producing forgeries with high pro-
bative value in favour of the hypothesis of forgery
(rather than authenticity). The reasons are mul-
tiple: first of all, specimens were provided in an
electronic format rather than in a printed form, im-
pairing absolute visual comparisons between one’s
forgery and a genuine sample. Also, there were no
visual guides on the document, to reduce the afore-
mentioned restraining eﬀect. Hence, the detected
diﬀerences are tied to the mode of presentation of
specimens to forgers.
We nevertheless chose to report this analysis, as
the method is applicable to any set of quantitative
measurements performed on every specimen. As an
example, we may repeat the same analyses on rel-
ative measurements (i.e., measurements which are
independent of absolute sizes).
From Figure 3, the visual clustering of signature
dimensions suggests us to treat them as samples
from k bivariate Gaussians, where k = 5 (i.e., num-
ber of writers in the corpora).
According to Bayes’ theorem (see Section 1.2),
in the numerator of the LR, the variability of the
signature dimensions is assessed in the genuine sig-
natures. In a real-world forensic context, as stated
in Section 1.1, one needs to specify the defence hy-
pothesis, hence the population of interest (denoted
7
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(a) An authentic signature.
(b) A forged signature. Notice that keypoint #9 is missing.
Figure 2: Two signatures in the corpora, with marked keypoints.
Symbol Name Domain Formula
S1 Signature width [0,∞) -
S2 Signature height [0,∞) -
D1 Absolute word spacing [0,∞] |H17 −H16|
D2 Relative word spacing [0, 1] D1/S1
D3 Initial height [0,∞) |min(V1, V3)−max(V7, V8, V9))|
D4 Small caps height [0,∞) |H14 −H15|
D5 Caps height ratio [0, 1] D4/D3
D6 Absolute first name length [0,∞) |H16 −H7|
D7 Relative first name length [0, 1] D6/S1
Θ1 Angle inside upper loop of L [0°, 360°) Angle between keypoints 1, 2, 4
Θ2 Angle between ascender of L and keypoint 9 [0°, 360°) Angle between keypoints 3, 5, 9
Θ3 Angle inside G [0°, 360°) Angle between keypoints 11, 12, 13
Φ1 Slant of ascender of L [0°, 360°) Slope of line between keypoints 3, 5
Φ2 Slant of descender of G [0°, 360°) Slope of line between keypoints 12, 13
Table 2: List of keypoint-based measures. Formulae are omitted with angles and slants. Hi (Vi) denotes the horizontal
(vertical) distance in mm between the i-th keypoint and the top-left corner of the signature. Please note that Hi is
not related to the hypothesis H.
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with F). The probability of the evidence under the
defence hypothesis appears as the denominator of
the LR.
We consider the following hypotheses: H = hp =
“The questioned signature has been written by A”
vs H = hd = “The questioned signature has been
written by someone in F”.
If two writers need to be compared, our cor-
pora are able to produce 4 kinds of comparisons
with the reference material, one for each forger (i.e.
{A vs Fi}
4
i=1). In that case, F is represented by
the corpus produced by the considered forger.
If the number of potential writers remains un-
known, however, the 5-class comparison problem
becomes a two-class comparison problem, i.e., “au-
thentic” (H = hp) vs “forged” (H = hd). In the
latter case, F = {F1, F2, F3, F4} = FAll: i.e., under
hd we state that a signature has been produced by
one of the F . Notice that we consider writers in
F as being “indistinguishable” from each other, as
they are grouped together under a single distribu-
tion, the one under hd. In other words, we consider
forged specimens as having been written by a single
“virtual” writer FAll. We also observe that, under
the latter, the Gaussian structure under hd cannot
be assumed in our corpora.
To simulate a real-world comparison procedure,
we performed a leave-one out cross-validation.
From the corpora we extracted a questioned signa-
ture; the remaining part will serve as the training
data, which is used to infer the various distribu-
tional parameters. The questioned signature is fi-
nally evaluated against the updated distributions,
thereby producing a LR value. This procedure is
repeated until the corpora are exhausted, thereby
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Figure 3: Plot of signature dimensions. Colours repre-
sent the identity of the forger, where “A” marks the au-
thor of genuine specimens. To aid visual separation and
to suggest distributional hypotheses, we superimposed
the smallest ellipses covering 95% of the points [29].
producing n = 239 LR values. We expect to obtain
LRs greater than 1 in the authentic corpus, and
LRs smaller than 1 otherwise.
In the light of previous remarks, we collect S1 and
S2 in a vector, and we model the vector S = (S1, S2)
as follows:
S |H = h, µh,Σh ∼ N2(µh,Σh), (1)
where h ∈ {hp, hd} is value of the considered hy-
pothesis (H = hp in authentic signatures, H = hd
otherwise), and
(
µh,Σh
)
are respectively the max-
imum likelihood estimates of the mean and the co-
variance matrix under h. By abuse of notation, we
will write, e.g., µp instead of µhp . In short, the
model is the following:
s(i)
∣∣∣H(i) = h, µh,Σh iid∼ N2(µh,Σh)
∀i : wi ∈ {A} ∪ F . (2)
We are assuming that signature dimensions are
temporally indistinguishable (i.e., there is no de-
pendence on i), and their distribution corpora can
be fully described with a mean vector, and a co-
variance matrix. The model (1) is represented as a
9
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H
Σpµp µd Σd
S
Figure 4: The model (1) represented as a Bayesian net-
work.
Bayesian network in Figure 4.
The LR value is computed by evaluating the
probability density function of the questioned pair
(S1, S2) under the competing hypotheses. In for-
mulae:
LR(i) =
f(s(i);µp,Σp)
f(s(i);µd,Σd)
∀i : wi ∈ {A} ∪ F ,
where µp, Σp, µd, Σd have been estimated us-
ing the remaining parts of the considered corpora
(i.e., for the i-th LR, all specimens with indexes
{j : wj = A ∧ j ̸= i} under hp, and all specimens
with indexes {j : wj ∈ F ∧ j ̸= i} under hd).
In Figure 5 we show the LR obtained for each
specimen under two comparison scenarios. Notice
the very large LR values: this may be due to the
fact that in our model there is no uncertainty on
the parameters of the Gaussian distributions, as we
substituted their respective maximum likelihood es-
timates. Tippett plots for all scenarios are reported
in Figure 6, while corresponding confusion matrices
are reported in Table 3.
Notice that in order to produce a fully Bayesian
model, in (1) we should specify a prior on µh, Σh
and the hypothesis H. [30] For this study, how-
ever, we substituted the maximum likelihood es-
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(a) F = {F3}, i.e., comparison between two writers,
hd =“The signature has been written by F3”.
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(b) F = {F1, F2, F3, F4}, i.e., comparison between 5 writ-
ers, hd =“The signature has been written by any of the
F”.
Figure 5: LRs obtained through cross-validation in two
diﬀerent scenarios. Each point represents a questioned
signature, evaluated against the rest of the corpora. The
resulting Log LR value is represented by its colour. El-
lipses containing 95% of the competing distributions of
the S are added, while triangles and circles are super-
imposed on cases where the LR supports the wrong hy-
pothesis. Note the large diﬀerence in evidence strength
between Figure 5a and Figure 5b.
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Figure 6: Tippett plots of signature sizes under 5 diﬀerent comparison scenarios. The dashed line marks LR = 1.
F = FAll F = F1 F = F2 F = F3 F = F4
Ground truth LR < 1 LR ≥ 1 LR < 1 LR ≥ 1 LR < 1 LR ≥ 1 LR < 1 LR ≥ 1 LR < 1 LR ≥ 1
Hp 4 139 4 139 0 143 2 141 11 132
Hd 79 17 34 1 20 0 18 3 18 2
Table 3: Confusion matrices across 5 diﬀerent comparison scenarios.
timates in their corpora, as performed in [31]: this
both simplifies the reasoning, and greatly reduces
the amount of calculations which have to be com-
puted. A fully Bayesian modelling can be at-
tempted to account for parameter uncertainty, as
done in [30, 32, 33, 34].
A further possible extension is to also infer |F|
(i.e., the number of forgers in the corpora), and
the individual characteristics of each writer. The
fully Bayesian tools of choice are Dirichlet Process
Mixture Models [35].
5.1.1. Sensitivity to dataset size
To investigate on the sensitivity of the method
introduced in 5.1, we conducted a sensitivity anal-
ysis of the LR on the particular choice of the
dataset. Specifically, instead of using the entire au-
thentic corpus to estimate the population param-
eters (µp and Σp), we considered smaller random
subsets of specimens of increasing size (8 sizes be-
ing {5, 10, 12, 15, 20, 30, 50, 90}, while the authentic
corpus has size 143). For each subset size, we re-
peated the analysis 10 times, each time choosing a
new subset, thus obtaining 10 × 8 = 80 likelihood
ratios for each specimen, for a fixed F (the set of
possible forgers). An averaged LR can be formed
by combining the 10 repetitions for each image and
for each subset size. The arithmetic mean of such
repetitions has been indicated with the symbol LR.
It is worthwhile noting that it is possible to per-
form other kinds of aggregations, such as majority
voting. Large sample properties, however, do not
change.
Only the authentic corpus has been subsampled
for two reasons. First, the forged corpora are al-
ready very small with respect to the authentic cor-
pus (see Table 1): a further resampling could intro-
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duce artifacts in the obtained distributions. Sec-
ondly, this enables us to approach dataset sizes
which are more commonly encountered in practi-
cal cases: e.g., we computed the likelihood ratios
by comparing 20 authentic specimens and 20 forg-
eries.
To summarise the sensitivity results, we use Tip-
pett plots shown in Figure 7. To ease interpreta-
tion, we have only shown the averaged likelihood
ratio LR: also, the tails of the distributions have
been cut oﬀ to highlight the increasing spread for
smaller dataset sizes. Notice how the likelihood ra-
tio is more sensitive for forgers who produced forg-
eries with more variable sizes (e.g., F2). Also, it
reveals how important it is to consider writers sep-
arately instead of grouping them together under the
virtual writer FAll.
It can be shown that the size of the subsets heav-
ily impacts the range of the likelihood ratios ob-
tained, but does not significantly aﬀect whether a
likelihood ratio obtained for a given specimen sup-
ports the correct hypothesis. This last eﬀect is
shown in the confusion matrices in Table 4. For
small dataset sizes, a signature can obtain contrast-
ing LR values across repetitions. As more data
is considered for estimation of population param-
eters, the LR converges to the one obtained using
the entire dataset, as in the previous section. This
is mostly due to the fact that the maximum likeli-
hood estimators are unreliable unless the size of the
dataset is suﬃciently large.
A fully Bayesian analysis would heavily reduce
this problem by leveraging on past data (repre-
sented by priors) as well as hypotheses on popu-
lation parameters. However, the development of a
fully Bayesian method is not straight-forward, and
is out of scope of the current article.
5.2. Angles and slants
As stated in Section 4.3, angles and slants are
highly dependent on the specific case. Moreover,
within the collected authentic corpus it is not ap-
parent how to define measures which are both
angle-based and easy to extend to other kinds of
signatures.
Another diﬃculty lies in the properties of the nu-
merical domain where angles and slants lie. Com-
mon classifiers do not reliably work, and particular
care is needed even to define the sample mean [36].
Circular statistics, and in particular Bayesian ex-
tensions, still pose many open research questions.
We nevertheless decided to briefly report our col-
lected data, leaving the possibility to expand its
analysis in future works, as suggested in Section 1.3.
Summary statistics are reported in Figures 8
and 9. Notice that angles and slants are much less
clearly distributed than the absolute dimensions of
signatures. Also, some keypoints are often miss-
ing in the corpora (e.g., keypoint 9), which leads to
the impossibility of measuring an angle or a slant.
As a consequence of this interplay, in some cases
we speculate that evidence provided by absolute
angular measurements can be dominated by other
characteristics, such as presence or absence of key-
points, or the impossibility to obtain angular mea-
surements.
5.3. Proportions and distances
In this subsection we explore a joint representa-
tion for the measures reported in Table 2. Specif-
ically, we focus on the measures D = (Dj)
7
j=1, as
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Figure 7: Tippett plots of sensitivity on dataset size under 5 diﬀerent comparison scenarios. The LR is averaged
over 10 subsamplings for a fixed subset size. The dashed vertical line marks LR = 1.
F = FAll F = F1 F = F2 F = F3 F = F4
Ground truth Subset size LR < 1 LR ≥ 1 LR < 1 LR ≥ 1 LR < 1 LR ≥ 1 LR < 1 LR ≥ 1 LR < 1 LR ≥ 1
Hp 5 7 136 4 139 0 143 2 141 11 132
10 5 138 4 139 0 143 3 140 11 132
12 6 137 4 139 0 143 1 142 12 131
15 4 139 4 139 0 143 2 141 11 132
20 4 139 4 139 0 143 1 142 11 132
30 4 139 4 139 0 143 1 142 11 132
50 4 139 4 139 0 143 1 142 11 132
90 4 139 4 139 0 143 2 141 11 132
Hd 5 75 21 34 1 20 0 18 3 18 2
10 78 18 34 1 20 0 18 3 18 2
12 78 18 34 1 20 0 18 3 18 2
15 78 18 34 1 20 0 18 3 18 2
20 78 18 34 1 20 0 18 3 18 2
30 79 17 34 1 20 0 18 3 18 2
50 78 18 34 1 20 0 18 3 18 2
90 79 17 34 1 20 0 18 3 18 2
Table 4: Sensitivity of the confusion matrices in Table 3 to subset size across 5 diﬀerent comparison scenarios. LR
denotes the likelihood ratio averaged over 10 trials for each chosen subset size.
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(a) Kernel density estimates of angle densities across
writers. Notice that densities of angle 4 → 5 → 9 are
extremely noisy due to the limited number of samples.
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(b) Proportion of measurable angles in a given corpus. An
angle is not measurable if any of its keypoints is missing.
Figure 8: Summary of angle-based measures.
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(a) Kernel density estimates of slant densities across writ-
ers. Slants have been beforehand centered around their
circular mean. Notice that densities of slant 5 → 9 are
extremely noisy due to the limited number of samples.
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(b) Proportion of measurable slants in a given corpus. A
slant is not measurable if any of its keypoints is missing.
Figure 9: Summary of slant-based measures.
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they do not suﬀer issues that characterise angles
and slants.
Their distributions have been summarised in Fig-
ure 10. To isolate the most discriminant features,
the article [21] proceeds with Boruta feature selec-
tion. On our corpora, however, all features are la-
belled as being important, thus defeating the goal
of the feature selection step.
Nevertheless, to gain insight into the structure of
the corpora with a joint visualisation, we explored
a representation of the observed d = {di}
7
i=1 into
a lesser-dimensional space. To this purpose, there
are a host of techniques which fall under the cate-
gory of Multidimensional Scaling (MDS): as an ex-
ample, PCA is strongly related to the simplest MDS
techniques. All MDS techniques map points to the
lesser-dimensional space such that those who are
most similar, they are represented as being closer,
while points that are very dissimilar get spread far
apart. Notice that MDS techniques work with unla-
belled (“unsupervised”) data.
In particular, we applied t-distributed Stochas-
tic Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE)[37]: this technique
is very powerful, well suited for high-dimensional
databases, and it has been specifically conceived to
map vectors from any space to a plane (R2). How-
ever, it has some drawbacks: the convergence to a
global optimum is not guaranteed, it is a stochastic
method (hence results are not easily reproducible),
and it does not provide a means to map a new point
on a past representation. Furthermore, it is often
diﬃcult to interpret the learned characteristics, as
they are non-linear and do not have a specific geo-
metrical meaning (unlike other dimensional reduc-
tion techniques such as principal components).
The results of t-SNE have been represented in
Figure 11: notice the intrinsic similarity between
specimens produced by each forger. This gives us
hope for obtaining a statistical model capable of
distinguishing evidence from diﬀerent forgers in fu-
ture works.
5.4. Marquis’ Fourier descriptors
The idea behind this approach is to decompose
each closed loop as a Fourier series of harmonic
components. Following [23], from each closed loop
we first extract the contour, we normalize its area2,
we describe it in polar coordinates as ρ = f(θ) (see
Figure 12) and we represent f with a Fourier se-
ries3:
f(θ) = A1 +
∞∑
k=2
Ak cos (θ (k − 1) + τk)
The set of amplitudes and phases (Ak, τk)
K
k=k0
forms the Fourier descriptors, which characterize
the shape of the loop.
We chose to consider only harmonics with k ∈
{2, . . . , 5}, as A1 is tied to the loop radius, and
harmonics above k = 5 have a negligible eﬀect on
the shape. The distribution of amplitude coeﬃ-
cients across letters, writers and harmonic index is
reported in Figure 13.
A number of observations can be made on Fourier
descriptors.
2The motivation behind area normalization is to be able
to measure deviations from circular shapes rather than vari-
ations in scale. As a consequence, all loops have approxi-
mately the same mean radius, represented by the term A1.
3To conform to the literature, we use a upper-case no-
tation: the distinction between random variables and their
realisations is left to the context.
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Figure 10: Boxplots for all measures in Table 2.
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θ x
y
ρ
Figure 12: A closed loop in polar coordinates. Figure
adapted from [23].
First of all, shape information can be properly
described only by considering pairs (Ak, τk). All
pairs are shown in Figure 14, distinguishing by let-
ter and writer. Notice the discriminative power of
the third harmonic.
It is necessary to note that all τks are aﬀected
by the same problems as the angles in Section 5.2.
In fact, the τks are not necessarily restricted to
a small neighbourhood of some τ0, but can eas-
ily assume any angle in the unit circle: this de-
feats methods based on small deviations from a
common mean, or methods that do not wrap dis-
tributions around the unit circle. Consequently,
rather than building a classifier as in [23], in future
works we will seek a representation of Fourier coeﬃ-
cients which is free from these issues. In particular,
the Cartesian representation of Fourier descriptors
lies in the Euclidean plane. We hence conjecture
that (Ak cos τk, Ak sin τk) can be modelled as sam-
ples from Gaussian bivariate distributions, whose
parameters mainly depend on writers, letters and
harmonic index. Based on these hypotheses, one
can then apply the model described in Section 5.1
for each harmonic.
Similarly to keypoints, the presence or the ab-
sence of a loop can be a strong indicator for, or
against, the authenticity of a signature. This is not
directly expressed through Fourier coeﬃcients, but
will be nevertheless integrated into the Bayesian
network by means of a binary node M , as stated
in Section 1.3.
6. Discussion
So far we presented brief insights on the capabil-
ities of the corpora we collected. It is clear that fu-
ture works will heavily exploit Bayesian multivari-
ate statistical models. We expect that significant
challenges will be posed by the study of individual
characteristics.
In particular, the Bayesian approach on Fourier
descriptors illustrated in Section 5.4 opens a num-
ber of research questions concerning the description
of the joint distribution of harmonic coeﬃcients.
It is noteworthy that Fourier analysis appears in
many diﬀerent technical disciplines. Any progress
achieved in this field could provide insight on the us-
age of Bayesian methods in other forensic domains
such as spectroscopy or chemistry.
Another facet to be explored is the denominator
of the likelihood ratio. As detailed in Section 5.1,
its definition changes according to the relevant pop-
ulation that is accounted for (previously noted as
F). As a consequence, one may introduce Bayesian
mixture models and non-parametric methods to au-
tomatically evaluate the presence of several classes
in the data.
The next challenge is posed by the construction of
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Figure 13: Amplitude density across harmonic indexes, writers and letters. Notice the logarithmic x axis. The third
harmonic is always the strongest.
the Bayesian network. This phase will significantly
exploit domain knowledge from forensic experts, in
order to account for interdependence between fea-
tures.
In general, there are no guidelines on how to con-
struct a sensible network. However, there are a
number of attempts in literature detailing individ-
ual aspects. As an example, a very recent study
[34] related to Marquis’ Fourier descriptors is avail-
able. Such study will serve us as a basis to integrate
them into a more general framework. Moreover,
in Section 1.3 we described the motivation behind
the evaluation of missing evidence: this section will
certainly benefit from techniques addressed to treat
missing data.
A fundamental problem underlying the project is
the very high data dimensionality. Forensic doc-
ument examiners commonly work with very few
specimens, so a good characterization of the dis-
tributions is often challenging. It is then impera-
tive to integrate techniques to perform feature se-
lection or dimensionality reduction. To this pur-
pose we can also exploit domain knowledge from
fingerprint comparison: specifically, one may aim
at introducing a biometric score between individ-
ual characteristics in signatures. Such measure
is one-dimensional, therefore drastically reducing
data dimensionality and easing inferences through
the Bayesian network.
A further extension of the work is the addition
of new measures and new features. In particular,
so far we only studied simple geometrical proper-
ties of signatures, while forensic experts commonly
rely also on other types of evidence such as pres-
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sure variations, line quality and background infor-
mation. Bayesian networks are easily extensible,
requiring the specification of the conditional distri-
butions for the desired feature, and the addition the
node(s) to the network.
We also plan to collect new forgeries of the au-
thentic corpus, as well as new corpora based on
other signatures of diﬀerent complexity. Specifi-
cally, this enables us to verify assumptions stated in
Section 4.3 on universality of measures, and in Sec-
tion 1.3 on case-based evidence. Moreover, with re-
spect to Section 1.1, it also will help us to establish
the feasibility of transposing the results from closed
to open-set situations, where the relevant popula-
tion is much larger.
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Figure 14: Polar plot of pairs (Ak, τk) across harmonic indexes, writers and letters. Notice the diﬀerent amplitude
scales.
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Highlights
• The problem of evidence evaluation in compar-
ative signature examinations is explored.
• We propose a set of measurements which can
be performed on signatures, along with the cor-
responding statistical models.
• The aim is to build a Bayesian network for eval-
uating evidence of diﬀerent nature.
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